Auditors are 'on the edge of disaster'

by admin on September 18, 2006

in Tax and Ethics

The FT (paywall) is saying the US Chamber of Commerce is deeply concerned that litigation against accounting firms could precipitate a disaster:

It reflects concern over the possibility that one of them – PwC, Deloitte, KPMG or Ernst & Young – could collapse if multi-million dollar lawsuits brought for alleged negligence bring a firm’s partnership to its knees.

The Chamber’s co-chairperson William Daley believes the risks to the remaining forms would ‘skyrocket.’ He also claims:

…the next tier of firms lacked the capacity to take on the business of a collapsed larger firm.

This is clearly designed to protect the Big Four. Why? Vested interests? Why should it be that Andersen was allowed to collapse but it is now no longer acceptable that the misdeeds of the remainder should go unpunished. OK – the US is the most litigious country on the planet but this plea is not good enough. Andersen was a travesty – an entire firm destroyed by the misdeeds and greed of a few. But then that’s part of the problem with collective responsibility as envisaged by partnership.

The Big Four have collectively wrecked the reputation of the profession. They consistently fight against attempts to breach their oligarchy, most recently engaging in blatant political chicanery under the pretext of protecting corporate tax payers. Despite the appearance of neutrality, they are hopelessly conflicted. Sarbanes-Oxley has become the full employment charter for these firms, beaming with delight as they report ever higher profits.

When, as is the case with PWC, the average partner profit (not the top or the bottom but average) is £716K, then you have to ask: what risks are they prepared to shoulder? Apparently few. Yet the tales of woe continue. Again from the FT (paywall), CA shareholders are up in arms over continuing accounting problems with one of the three US proxy advisory groups calling for KPMG to not be reappointed as auditors.

CA is a poisoned chalice so whomever takes it over has a problem on their hands. Nonetheless, I warned back in 1999-2000 that CAs accounts were such a mess that it was almost impossible to figure out what was going on. At the time, I was asked to dissect the figures and couldn’t. CA kept shifting the goal posts on revenue recognition leading to horrendous obfuscation. When you see stuff like this from afar, how come the auditors didn’t call the directors to account? We now know the directors were actively engaged in fraud.

What the Big Four don’t understand is that the perception of public safety they have fostered through work done to ensure SOX compliance has consequences. No good crying wolf now. I’ve warned this year could see a major collapse. Unless the regulatory bodies get a grip (and that includes ICAEW with its see-saw approach to ethics and IASB with its position on tax) then don’t be surprised to see one of them take a massive hit.

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There was a time where U.S. audit firms (quietly) thought of themselves as insurers-of-sorts ... at least until they started having to pay off on "quasi-insurance claims" in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s! They then seemed to backtrack when they claimed that "we certainly can't be held responsible for outright financial reporting fraud". As we all know The Public thought differently and we have a new auditing standard circa 2002 on auditors' responsibility to plan audits to detect material fraud.

I've been doing some re-reading on several of the more infamous audit failures (e.g., Enron, Waste Management, WorldCom) and a common aspect among them is that all involved a de facto lack of auditor independence. Hmmm ... let's see: Aren't auditors required to be independent *according the auditing standards that THEY WROTE THEMSELVES*?! I think so ... [checking] ... Yes, it turns out that in 1972 (for God's Sake) they wrote the following in SAS #1, Section 220:

It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general public maintain confidence in the independence of independent auditors. Public confidence would be impaired by evidence that independence was actually lacking, and it might also be impaired by the existence of circumstances which
reasonable people might believe likely to influence independence. ... Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should avoid situations that
may lead outsiders to doubt their independence.

Well, that seems clear enough to me. In the referenced audit failures, consulting fees exceeded audit fees (by a factor of roughly between 2 and 4) and the audit firm's partners were compensated based on maintenance of the consulting fees. If this is not de facto economic dependence I don't know what is; actually in both appearance and fact!

What are we to do? I think economics provides an (albiet unpleasant) explanation, prediction, and prescription: PwC (and other firms') partners are making big money because they're being compensated for the unusually high risks they're taking; high risk and high return go hand in hand. They're probably now on the cusp of realizing the dark side of the risk they took on. Shouldn't we let them have that important experience?

What are we not to do? I don't think the proper lesson will be learned if the U.S. Chamber of Commerce intervenes to prevent a crisis. Even more importantly, it seems important at all costs to avoid another Full Employment Act for CPAs (a la Sarbanes-Oxley 2002).

After all, we all know what happens in such crises from having watched Arthur Andersen: A bunch of partners lose a lot of money which they probably didn't earn in a competitive market anyway; that is, they didn't really earn (all of) it anyway!

I completely agree with your thoughts Dennis, regarding how the Big Four have ruined the reputation of the industry. But what is the solution to the problem? Is it as intractable as it seems? Is a forced breaking-up of the firms the only fix?

Dennis

You hit the nail on the head. Not once, but several times.

By any measure £716k is what an economist would call a 'super normal' profit. It is generated not by ability, or from the value of the service, but from monopoly power. In this cae that monopoloy has been granted by the state (or a numbr of states acting in concert to require audit) and has been exploited by a tiny minority to maintain their wealth.

That is what the opposition from these firms to transaprecny and accountability is about. They know that without this monopoly, and the myths that support it (such as the fact that no-one else can deliver what they do) keep them in luxury beyond the dreams of most.

What they have forgotten though is that with power comes responsibility. But they don't accept that. They do instead promote irresponsibility, or stand back when others do it for them.

Take an example. Have the Big 4 condemned Jersey for introducing trust laws that will make their lives as trustees in that island untenable because they will not be able to fulfil the proper duties of that role without interference from a settlor? No, of course they have not. That's because they are, to put it simply, irresponsible, and are happy to exploit the abuse that others offr to them in the name of law in such places.

Without transformation the real question is not whether we can afford to live without these firms, it's for how long we can afford to live with them. Some time ago I said that I thought their practices in endorsing international tax planning, driving down taxes and in undermining the credibility of reprting to the extent that determining fair taxation liabilities was becoming nigh on impossible was one of the greatest threats that existed to the western democratic capitalist way of life. I stand by that view.

Richard

Richard Murphy
http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/blog/.

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